Would you like to receive this and/or other newsletters directly from ECRE?
Subscribe

EDITORIAL

EDITORIAL

Europe tested or what to do when the world’s most powerful country goes rogue…

By Catherine Woollard

Before the inauguration of Trump, there was a lot of discussion both inside and outside the US of strategies for managing his pending arrival. It already looks very naïve after the blitz of measures unleashed, many of them truly alarming in terms of their content but also in their disregard for the rule of law, for the separation of powers, for the US constitution and for the provisions of international law and the international system.

A few weeks ago, the cliché branded about was the need “to separate the signal from the noise” when it comes to Trump. The expression is used in the intelligence sector and means distinguishing between what is meaningful in that it will have a significant impact, i.e. the signals that need to be integrated into planning and responses, and what is just hot air – the noise. The subtext was that with Trump one could expect a lot of the latter – the noise of rhetoric, polemic, ideas that don’t go anywhere. After a week and half, the situation is confoundingly, shockingly the opposite. These are signals, alarm bells for the international system and for us all. They are measures with immediate, dramatic impact. The shock is compounded because it remains to be seen whether Europe and the EU specifically is capable of an adequate response, proportionate to what has been launched.

In effect, there is little that has been announced that won’t have a significant impact on Europe – and the rapid lurch towards authoritarianism of Europe’s closest ally presents multiple unconceived challenges. Filtering through the executive orders, at first sight, the most relevant to Europe include the proposals severely curtailing access to international protection in the US. Many of the people arriving at the border will not be able to apply for asylum and the government has also cancelled temporary protection programmes, including the programmes for Ukrainians and for Venezuelans (currently 800,000 people from Venezuela benefit). There is also the cruel denial of entry to some 15,000 Afghan refugees already cleared for admission. The wider immigration measures include the apparently unconstitutional removal of birthright citizenship and the plans for wide-scale deportations.

Then, the 90-day suspension of all foreign aid has plunged the humanitarian and development system into crisis, with international organisations, NGOs and partner governments losing a major income source from one day to the next. This affects many of the crises at Europe’s borders and in the wider regions south of the continent. The situation in Jordan – benefiting from significant US budget support and not exempted like Egypt – and in Sudan, where horrific violence rages, are just two that could be highlighted. But cancellation of humanitarian assistance programmes in Turkey, Lebanon, Afghanistan etc etc are all also relevant.

Then… the proposals to annex or buy Greenland shows total disregard for the basic precepts of international law; trade warfare with the imposition of tariffs is threatened; withdrawal from the Paris agreement and reversal of all environmental protection leaves Europe pretty lonely in the battle against climate change; and so on.

Beyond the individual policies, there is an equally alarming background of authoritarianism: the adoption of flagrantly unconstitutional measures; the cancelling of acts passed by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court; the hate speech, scapegoating, and risk of persecution even of certain “enemies within” (immigrants). The chilling effect of pardoning violent insurrectionists combined with removing security protection from critics, means that very suddenly opposing the government (or should we already say regime?) has become very dangerous. It is all accompanied by the corruption that authoritarians wallow in – meme coins to facilitate anonymous donations and personal enrichment of the leader and his wife; removal of all statutory watchdog roles in institutions; and the oligarchs closing ranks around the big man. Putinism is the model.

The EU institutions and Member State governments are no doubt in shock along with everybody else. While some national leaders have spoken out on some measures, there has been little official response from the Commission. It is to be hoped that assessment of the impact and development of response strategies is underway. Even at this early stage, various factors appear important.

First, more EU appears to be an advantage. On trade, there are lessons from the last Trump administration and the potential measures have been extensively discussed already. But, in addition, that this is an EU competence and the Commission is in the lead, is reassuring. In other areas, EU response will depend on decisions of the Member States and in some cases unanimity is required. The risks attached to the presence of Member States which are Trump allies (as well as being Putin allies) comes into play. The disruptive power of disloyal anti-EU Member States will hamper responses in all foreign and security policy matters, for example.

Second, the level of dependence on the US is also key. The debate on strategic autonomy over the last five years is the latest French attempt to build up a purely European defence architecture. While support for Ukraine has led to a rapid acceleration in the militarisation of Europe, for good and for ill, it has also shown that individually or collectively Europe has practically no defence capability that can be operated autonomously of the US. NATO, the outsized role of the US globally, the insistence on interoperability all creates dependence that starts to look like a huge risk. It was already very clear that Europe would not be able to support Ukraine without the US and a change in US policy is likely to lead to an imposed peace agreement later this year. But the dependency is far wider than this conflict.

Third, Europe’s response will be significantly shaped by direct US interference in European politics and whether serious resistance is mounted. The actions of Elon Musk, a member of the new government and currently key ally of the President, in promoting the AfD and strengthening its hand in the forthcoming election in Germany are extraordinary and outrageous. There is more to come. The far right across Europe will be supported and inspired by Trump and his acolytes, with funding and social media backing. It is not clear how to respond collectively and sensibly to the new order when Europe is undermined from within in this way.

One strand of discussion is whether Europe will be forced to choose between the US and China, given what appeared to be an escalating conflict between the two. The suggestion from the Commission President is still that the old alliance will hold and that Europe will side with the US, not least because disentangling Europe from the US in so many areas hardly seems possible. US isolationism is central to the MAGA approach – while fewer military adventures would be welcome, pulling out of international institutions and collapsing the humanitarian system less so. The sheer power of the US – in terms of military, economic and technological might suggests that most countries will have to concede, in the way that Colombia rapidly did on the deportation issue. Surveying the global landscape, Europe looks very alone in defending the rules-based international order (insofar as it remains committed to it). Re-alignment across the international system looks likely, exacerbating the trend of chaotic competition between middle powers which is already wreaking havoc in many regions.

It’s not clear who Europe’s allies will be in this new world order – and whether through choice, coercion, dependence or internal interference, the US will remain among them. If it is, after the last ten days, with friends like these…

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS

• The European Commission (EC) is planning to overhaul its funding to Tunisia in response to revelations of abuses committed by EU-funded security forces.
• The EC has signed a € 3 billion agreement with Jordan.
• The Tunisian parliament is deliberating a draft law that would allow the deportation of people on the move from Tunisia to their countries of origin.
• The EC has admitted that a contractor who was recruited to undertake rights monitoring in Libya only reports on “potential risks” of EU-funded projects violating the ‘Do no harm’ principle rather than any actual violations.
• An NGO has estimated that at least 31,404 people were deported from Algeria to Niger in 2024.
• A group of NGOs has raised concerns about a planned agreement between the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and Egypt.

The European Commission (EC) is planning to overhaul its funding to Tunisia in response to revelations of abuses committed by EU-funded security forces. In September 2024, the Guardian newspaper reported that Tunisian security forces had committed numerous acts of violence, including sexual violence, against people on the move in the country. On 24 January, it reported that EC officials were drawing up “concrete” conditions to ensure that future EU funding to Tunisia would go ahead “only if human rights have not been violated”. According to an EC spokesperson, the change represented a “re-dynamisation” of the EU’s partnership with Tunisia. The spokesperson also stated that a series of subcommittees would be set up in the coming months to ensure that human rights would be central to it. Commenting on the latest Guardian report, the director of Human Rights Watch’s EU office, Philippe Dam, welcomed the EC’s commitment to put human rights at the centre of its engagement with Tunisia and made the following recommendations for its implementation: “No EU funding to entities engaged in violations; Concrete rights conditions; and Independent assessments and monitoring for all migration funds”.

The EC has signed a € 3 billion agreement with Jordan. According to a statement issued by EC President Ursula von der Leyen following the signature of the ‘EU-Jordan Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership’ on 29 January, it will enable the EU and Jordan to “strengthen their co-operation on border management, the fight against smuggling and human trafficking” and “enhance co-operation on durable solutions for refugees, including complementary pathways for protection and safe, voluntary and dignified returns, also in co-operation with international agencies”. Commenting on the agreement, Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, who signed on behalf of the EU, said: “This strategic and comprehensive partnership will increase security, stability and economic opportunities for Jordan and the EU, directly benefitting our citizens”.

The Tunisian parliament is deliberating a draft law that would allow the deportation of people on the move from Tunisia to their countries of origin. It follows the government’s claim that 7,250 people were “voluntarily repatriated” in 2024. According to the New Arab news website, the draft law sets out a legal framework for deportations which includes exemptions for people who may be at risk of suffering torture or inhumane treatment in their home countries and the possibility for people to appeal deportation orders in administrative courts. The New Arab reported that the Tunisian Observatory for Human Rights had denounced the proposal as “unethical and contradictory” and that it had accused the Tunisian government of using the draft law as a “backdoor to formalise its ongoing practice of forced deportations”. The Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) was equally scathing in its assessment of the draft law. “This law is just populism dressed up as policy,” said FTDES spokesperson Ramadan Ben Omar.

The EC has admitted that a contractor who was recruited to undertake rights monitoring in Libya only reports on “potential risks” of EU-funded projects violating the ‘Do no harm’ principle rather than any actual violations. According to EUobserver, in April 2022, a senior EC official said that the contractor that it had hired to monitor its projects in Libya “didn’t report any violations of the do-no-harm principle directly related to all costs by our trust fund programmes”. However, on 17 January, the EC wrote to EUobserver to clarify that the contractor’s reports “do not provide ‘evidence’ that violations of the ‘do no harm’ principle have occurred”. Although the revelation that the contractors reports actually only highlight “potential risks” of violations does not prove that EU-funded equipment is being used by the Libyan authorities in a way that violates the ‘Do no harm’ principle, it seems to imply that the EC is not fully informed on this issue. This conclusion was reflected in a European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) report on the implementation of the EU Trust Fund for Africa that was published in September 2024. “Commission staff with no in-depth knowledge of the activities funded by the EUTF in Libya, in particular their location, cannot link the highlighted risks to EUTF projects and cannot assess whether EU funded equipment is being used as intended and in line with the do-no-harm principle,” the ECA found.

An NGO has estimated that at least 31,404 people were deported from Algeria to Niger in 2024. According to Alarme Phone Sahara, this figure represented a 21% increase from the previous year (26,031) and an all-time record. The organisation has stated that the high number of deportations in 2024 can be partly explained by “increased co-operation between the Maghreb countries, which aims to make it more difficult for people from Niger to arrive and continue their journey, and to deport people on a large scale”. “Since 2023, there has been an increased in chain deportations, in which people are deported in Tunisia, often after sea pullbacks, to the Algerian border, and then by the Algerian security forces to the Niger border,” it added. Alarme Phone Sahara strongly condemned the Algerian government’s “ruthless” deportation policy and the “inhuman and sometimes fatal conditions” in which the people concerned have been deported.

A group of NGOs has raised concerns about a planned agreement between the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and Egypt. In an open letter to Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner dated 16 January, 29 organisations wrote that the proposed “working agreement” would “risk serving to legitimise the Egyptian police as a legitimate and reliable co-operation partner for the European Union, despite well-documented involvement in human rights violations and enforcing dictatorial rule in the country”. They also restated concerns about the possibility that Egypt’s recently adopted asylum law would “likely contravene international human rights and refugee law while overlooking crucial protection concerns for refugees and asylum seekers” and suggested that the exchange of intelligence and strategic information (but not personal data) that would be facilitated by the planned agreement would risk “facilitating and/or whitewashing further human rights violations in Egypt and in the EU (notably at its borders)”. The signatories also asked the EC to provide details of any “human rights or data protection due diligence” that it had conducted in advance of and/or during the ongoing negotiations.

Related articles

• EU EXTERNAL PARTNERS: Criticism over EU transfer of € 1 billion to Egypt for ‘credible steps’ on democracy and human rights ― New cases of migrant abuses by the Libyan authorities include mass deportation and torture in detention ― Tunisia’s detention of prominent refugee rights activists sparks international solidarity campaign ― Türkiye introduces new measures to facilitate voluntary return of Syrians ― Humanitarian agencies express readiness to relieve humanitarian crisis in Gaza following announcement of ‘tragically overdue’ ceasefire (January 2025)
• EU EXTERNAL PARTNERS: Egypt to ratify controversial new asylum law ― European Ombudsman finds maladministration by Commission regarding EU-Tunisia deal ― Civil society activists taken into custody in ‘anti-terrorism’ investigation in Tunisia (November 2024)

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS

• Four children have died in two shipwrecks in the Mediterranean.
• A recent NGO report has revealed that people housed in the closed controlled access centre on the Greek island of Samos are subjected to invasive surveillance practices.
• The Italian government has made a third attempt to transfer people rescued from the Mediterranean to its detention centres in Albania.
• Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and two members of her government are under investigation in connection with the repatriation of a Libyan general who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• The three young men known as the ‘El Hiblu 3’ who are facing terrorism charges in Malta for hijacking an oil tanker in March 2019 have lost their appeal for the case against them to be dropped.

A shipwreck in the Maltese search and rescue (SAR) area has claimed the lives of at least two children. According to a statement issued by the Sea Punks NGO on 26 January, a third child was missing while 18 people were rescued by its Sea Punk I rescue ship. Reacting to the latest tragedy, the United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF) country coordinator for Italy, Nicola Dell’Arciprete, said: “For too long, the Mediterranean has been a deadly crossing for children seeking safety and a better life”. “Last month, more than 300 people died or disappeared in its waters, many having fled conflict, poverty and persecution,” she added. Dell’Arciprete also called on EU member states to use the Pact on Migration and Asylum to prioritise child protection through safe legal pathways and coordinated search and rescue operations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) highlighted the ongoing risks of the Central Mediterranean route. While there was a 60% decrease in the number of recorded crossings in 2024, the number of deaths and disappearances only fell by 30%, indicating even greater risks for those attempting the journey. The IOM also called for urgent strengthening of SAR operations at sea, stressing that saving lives must remain a top priority in migration policies. On 27 January, 111 people, including a seven-year-old girl, were rescued by the NGO SOS MEDITERRANEE’s Ocean Viking rescue ship from two separate boats in the Maltese SAR zone. Two days later, the NGO reported that the girl had died.

A recent NGO report has revealed that people housed in the closed controlled access centre (CCAC) on the Greek island of Samos are being subjected to invasive surveillance practices. The report by I Have Rights and the Border Violence Monitoring Network revealed that 88% of interviewees reported having their phones taken upon arrival in the EU-funded centre. Although the Hellenic Police have denied confiscating people’s phones, the European Border and Coast Agency (Frontex)’s Fundamental Rights Office informed I Have Rights that the practice was “prescribed in the operational plan”. The report also sheds light on the use of two EU-funded surveillance systems that have been developed with the participation of two Greek and Israeli firms: Centaur and Hyperion. Centaur uses CCTV cameras, drones, and AI-based motion analytics to flag “threats” in the camp and its vicinity, while Hyperion relies on biometric data to control access to the facility. The report also includes demands for Greek authorities to stop phone confiscations and to ensure transparency in the deployment of surveillance technologies.

The Italian government has made a third attempt to transfer people rescued from the Mediterranean to its detention centres in Albania. On 28 January, an Italian naval ship carrying 49 people who had been rescued in international waters south of the Lampedusa arrived in the Albanian port of Shëngjin. The latest attempt comes after two previous failures in October and November 2024 when Italian courts ruled against the transfers. The cases have been referred to the Court of Justice of the EU which is due to rule on them on 25 February. Of the 49 people who entered the centre in Shëngjin, only 44 have been transferred to the centre in Gjadër while they wait for the applications to be processed. The other five, four minors and one person with health conditions, were returned to Italy due to their vulnerability. Commenting on the latest developments, ECRE member organisation the Italian Council for Refugees said: “The government is once again experimenting with the Albanian model for purely propagandistic purposes on the one hand and escalating the clash with the judiciary on the other, without waiting for the ruling of the European Court of Justice to continue operations”.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgi Meloni has X posted a video in which she announced that she and two of her cabinet ministers were being investigated by prosecutors in connection with the repatriation of a Libyan general who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). According to an ICC press release, General Osama Almasri Njeem, who had been arrested by Italian authorities and subsequently deported back to Libya, is suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, rape and sexual violence. In her video, Meloni argued that the ICC warrant had not been recognised by Italy’s courts, and that she was “the target of a left-wing conspiracy” intended to “blackmail” her. The deportation incident has sparked rage among politicians and human rights organisations. The head of the opposition Italia Viva party, Matteo Renzi, has accused Meloni’s government of hypocrisy given its claimed crackdown on human traffickers. “When a trafficker whom the International Criminal Court tells us is a dangerous criminal land on your table, it’s not like you chase him down, you brought him home to Libya with a plane of the Italian secret services,” he said. The NGO Mediterranea Saving Humans said that the Italian government’s “shameful protection” of Njeem showed that its deal with Libya was “dangerous and criminal.” A group of NGOs, including the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), issued a joint statement in which they denounced Italy’s failure to surrender the Libyan suspect to the ICC as a “breach of its Rome Statute obligation”.

The three young men who are facing terrorism charges in Malta for hijacking an oil tanker in March 2019 have lost their appeal for the case against them to be dropped. The three men, known as the ‘El Hiblu 3’, had argued that a Maltese court had no jurisdiction over the case as the alleged crimes took place outside Maltese territorial waters and no Maltese citizens were involved. When this claim was dismissed by a court in April 2024, the trio appealed and, on 22 January, the Court of Appeal upheld the original verdict. “These facts (…) can only be decided by the jury during the trial,” the court ruled. Reacting to the ruling, one of the defendants, Amara Kromah, said he was “devastated and angry”. “When we finally had the opportunity to escape the inhumane treatments in Libya, we couldn’t afford to be returned to a place where our freedoms and safety were not guaranteed anymore and coming to Malta was the only option we had to save our lives,” he added. A group of over 30 activists who have been supporting the El Hiblu 3 said the Maltese state was out to “make an example” of the three young men “to deter others from defending their basic human rights and righteously resisting pushbacks to Libya”. Describing the court’s decision as “disappointing”, Amnesty International said that the case represented “everything that is wrong with EU institutions and member states’ migration policies in the central Mediterranean”.

Related articles

• MEDITERRANEAN: Major fall in crossings in 2024 ― Fewer deaths and disappearances in 2024 ― ECtHR rules against Greece in ‘landmark’ case on pushbacks (January 2025)
• MEDITERRANEAN: NGOs accuse Greece of continuing to subject people in detention to ‘inhuman’ treatment ― Sharp rise in number of child arrivals in Greece and ‘alarming conditions’ in refugee camps ― Major increase in number of arrests for ‘people smuggling’ in Greece ― Council of Europe criticises conditions in pre-removal detention centres in Italy ― Geo Barents rescue vessel ceases operations ― Search and rescue NGOs fear ‘Flows Decree’ could further criminalise their activities (December 2024)

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• The Council for the Judiciary has urged the government to delay the introduction of its planned new asylum laws until the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum enters into force in 2026.
• The Inspectorate of Justice and Security has called on Minister of Asylum and Migration Marjolein Faber to address the ongoing unsafe conditions at the Ter Apel reception centre.
• The Dutch Council for Refugees has announced that it may have to stop providing legal support to people seeking asylum in the Netherlands following a major reduction in the funding that it receives from the government.

The Council for the Judiciary has urged the government to delay the introduction of its planned new asylum laws until the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum enters into force in 2026. On 27 January, the council expressed “great concerns” about the legislative proposals that were adopted by the cabinet in December 2024. “These new European rules will force a revision of the national asylum system and are also expected to have major consequences for the judiciary and other organisations in the migration chain, both in terms of workload and implementation,” it said.

The Inspectorate of Justice and Security has called on Minister of Asylum and Migration Marjolein Faber to address the ongoing unsafe conditions at the Ter Apel reception centre. On 15 January, the oversight body reported that safety and quality of life in Ter Apel and its external waiting locations “remain poor”. It also made a number of recommendations for making the centre “truly safe”, including “ensuring a good throughput and outflow of asylum seekers”. A spokesperson for the inspectorate added that it was not able to enforce the implementation of its recommendations. “We can bang the drum and make recommendations, but in this area, we cannot enforce,” they said. According to ECRE member organisation the Dutch Council for Refugees (DCR), the situation at Ter Apel is “nothing new”. The organisation attributed overcrowding in the centre to “the lack of flow – not due to the number of people”. It also referred to the “Distribution Act” (Spreidingswet) as a possible solution which would enable the government to designate suitable reception locations across the country. However, in November 2024, Faber stated that a legislative proposal to withdraw the act would be “submitted for advice and implementation tests in the first quarter of 2025”.

The DCR has announced that it may have to stop providing legal support to people seeking asylum in the Netherlands following a major reduction in the funding that it receives from the government. Since 2010, the organisation has worked with people who arrive in the Netherlands to explain the functioning of the asylum procedure, their rights and obligations, and the information and documents that they need to provide to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). However, on 2 January, DCR was informed that the government was reducing its support for the organisation’s Legal Protection programme from € 34 million to € 13 million with immediate effect. “Immediately more than halving the budget while the work remains the same as what the ministry expects of us – that puts us in an impossible position,” said the chair of DCR’s board, Frank Candel. “Faber wants the strictest asylum policy ever. This is the most counterproductive asylum policy ever,” he said. DCR is challenging the government’s decision in court.

Related articles

• NETHERLANDS: Netherlands leads group of countries calling for EU to speed up migrant returns ― Migration minister wants to install controversial warning signs in asylum centres and reduce length of residency permits for refugees ― Political agreement on proposed ‘Distribution Law’ despite government opposition (October 2024)
• NETHERLANDS: Government Announces ‘Strictest Asylum Policy Ever’ and Requests Opt-Out from EU Migration Pact ― Government Announces End to State-funded Housing for Rejected Asylum Applicants ― Demonstration Against Self-declared ‘Asylum Crisis’ ― Emergency Shelter Required After Asylum Centre Exceeds Capacity (September 2024)

RECENT REPORTS

ECRE

• AIDA Comparative Report: Access to Socio-economic Rights for Beneficiaries of Temporary Protection
• AIDA Statistical Update: The Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation in 2023

• Policy Paper: Rights of Women and Girls in the Asylum Procedure

ECRE Member Organisations

• Accem, La integración política de los inmigrantes y de sus hijos: acción política, participación y reconocimiento
• Association for Solidarity with Refugees (Mülteci-Der), Navigating Uncertainty: Challenges and Experiences of Refugees in Izmir – Insights from Focus Group Discussions (June-November 2024)
• Association for Solidarity with Refugees (Mülteci-Der), Report on İzmir and Aydin Removal Center Visits (July-September 2024)
• Refugee Support Aegean, Greek Asylum Case Law Report – Issue 2/2024

• British Red Cross, Family Reunification Toolkit (REPAIR)
• Dutch Council for Refugees, Unveiling the Pact on Asylum and Migration: Implementation at National and European Levels
• Greek Council for Refugees and Border Criminologies, Promise Versus Reality: Access to Justice for Refugees in Greece
• Greek Council for Refugees and Save the Children, “It does not feel like real life”: Children’s everyday life in Greek refugee camps
• Kids in Need of Defense, Reducing Risks in Uncertainty: The importance of free, quality legal assistance for unaccompanied and separated children displaced from Ukraine
• Refugee Support Aegean, Refugee facilities on the Aegean islands: What is the current situation in the Closed Controlled Access Centres

Others  

• Asylum Aid et al., Stateless People in the UK: At Risk of Legal Limbo, In Need of Protection
• Border Violence Monitoring Network, Balkan Regional Report – November 2024
• European Parliament, The gender dimension of asylum claims
• European Union Asylum Agency, Guidelines on Alternatives to Detention
• I Have Rights, Controlled and Confined: Unveilling the Impact of Technology in the Samos Closed Controlled Access Centre
• Migration Policy Institute, No One-Size-Fits-All: Outreach and counselling for irregular migrants
• Researchers X, State trafficking: Expulsion and sale of migrants from Tunisia to Libya
• Solomon, Invisible Walls: How AI Tech at Europe’s Borders Threatens People Seeking Refuge
• Sussex Centre for Migration Research, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies – Volume 51, Issue 1
• United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UNHCR’S 2025 Recommendations for the Polish and Danish Presidencies of the Council of the European Union (EU)

• Access Centre for Human Rights, Uprooting the Displaced: The Forced Evictions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
• Alarm Phone and LIMINAL, ‘They ignored us initially’: What happened in the Channel on 14 December, 2022?
• Border Criminologies, Border Violence Monitoring Network and Mobile Info Team, Report on the Conditions in Pre-Removal Detention Centres in Greece
• Caminando Fronteras, Monitoring the Right to Life – 2024
• Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH), La acción humanitaria en 2023-2024: Sudán y Gaza, muestra de la inacción internacional
• European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 2 to 12 April 2024
• European Court of Auditors, Special Report 26/2024: Integration of third-country nationals in the EU – Relevant support from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund but its impact could not yet be demonstrated
• European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination, Cyprus: Country report – Non-discrimination – 2024
• Forced Migration Review, Issue 74: Financing displacement response
• Free Movement, Briefing: Current problems in the UK asylum system and how to address them
• Human Rights Association (IHD), Refugee Rights Report within the Framework of the Action Plan on Human Rights
• Legal Centre Lesvos, Lesvos Situation Report – Quarterly Developments and Updates: July-September 2024
• Migration Policy Group, Political Participation Policy Index 2024: A Seat at the Table?
• Migration Policy Institute, Complementary Pathways: Key Factors in Future Growth
• Migration Policy Institute, Exploring Refugees’ Intentions to Return to Ukraine: Data Insights and Policy Responses
• Mixed Migration Centre, Mixed Migration Review 2024
• No Name Kitchen, EU states crack down on asylum seekers after al-Assad’s fall

Back to top

UPCOMING EVENTS

ECRE

• 5-6 March, Brussels, Training Seminar on Pact on Migration and Asylum

ECRE Member Organisations

• 6 February, Dublin, Warm Welcome Youth Project, Irish Refugee Council
• 13-22 June, Glasgow, Refugee Festival Scotland 2025, Scottish Refugee Council

Others

• 31 January, Online, JEMS Forum 2025: Displacement, University of Sussex
• 3-7 February, Florence, 2025 Migration Winter Academy, European University Institute
• 4 February, Brussels, Black Resistance Against EU Border Externalisation: Anti-Racist Struggles in Tunisia and Libya, The Left group in the European Parliament 
• 6 February, Online, Data protection in immigration and asylum: Rights and opportunities for redress, Statewatch
• 8 February, Sheffield, Thinking with our communities – detention and beyond, Right to Remain
• 3-7 March, London, Research Methods in the Refugee and Forced Migration Field, Refugee Law Initiative
• 8 March, London, Womens Run Series, Women for Refugee Women
• 10-11 March, Florence, Building effective engagement between research, policy and practice: a strategic approach to impactful migration research in the world of policy, European University Institute
• 17-19 March, Krems an der Donau, 2025 IMISCOE Spring Conference, University for Continuing Education Krems
• 17-21 March, Krems an der Donau, MIrreM Spring School 2025, University for Continuing Education Krems 
• 20-23 March, Budapest, Statelessness Awareness Forum (Europe), Apatride Network
• 12-17 May, Online, Migration Communication Strategies: Effective Approaches to Depolarise the Debate, European University Institute
• 30 June - 1 July, Inaugural Conference: Migration in times of Polarization, Vienna Centre for Migration and Law
• 6-8 October, Florence, Effective Migration Governance: Policy Impacts and Trade-Offs, European University Institute
• Online, Training Course: Temporary Protection in the European Union, Council of Europe

Back to top

OPEN JOB VACANCIES

ECRE Member Organisations

• Cepaim Foundation, Various
• Danish Refugee Council, Various
• Diakonie in Österreich, Various
• Entraide Pierre Valdo, Various
• Female Fellows, Various
• Fenix – Humanitarian Legal Aid, Interpreter, Remote
• Fenix – Humanitarian Legal Aid, Volunteer MHPSS Officer, Lesvos, 1 March
• Forum réfugiés, Various
• Jesuit Refugee Service, Various, Malta
• Kids in Need of Defense, Various
• Movement for Peace (MPDL), Various
• Red Cross, Engagement and Coordination Senior Officer, Brussels, 2 February
• Red Cross, Receptionist and Administration Assistant, Brussels, 2 February
• Scottish Refugee Council, Programming Fellow – Refugee Festival Scotland 2025, Glasgow, 12 February
• Solentra, Klinisch psycholoog – 5 jaar ervaring , Antwerp
• Solentra, Klinisch psycholoog – 10 jaar ervaring, Antwerp
• Solentra, Klinisch psycholoog, West Flanders

Others

• Diaspora Vote, Policy and Communication Officer, Brussels, 31 January
• European Legal Support Center, Junior Legal Officer, Amsterdam, 2 February
• European Legal Support Center, Monitor Officer, Germany, 31 January
• International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA Europe), Senior Partnerships Officer, Brussels, 13 February
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Refugee Protection Officer, 8 February
• Mobile Info Team, Research Officer, Thessaloniki,
• Refugee and Migrant Centre, Caseworker level 1, 2, and 3, Birmingham, 28 February
• Refugees Seeking Equal Access at the Table, Latin America Regional Lead, Brazil, Colombia or Mexico, 31 January
• Right to Remain, Finance and Operations Manager, London, 27 January 
• University of Sussex, Research Fellow, Brighton, 6 February
• Women for Refugee Women, Co-Chair of Board of Trustees, London, 7 February
• Women for Refugee Women, Policy and Research Manager, London, 24 February

Back to top

ONGOING CAMPAIGNS

CALLS FOR PAPERS, PROJECT PROPOSALS, UNIVERSITY COURSES etc.

Calls for Applications 

• Refugee Festival Scotland  2025 –Small Grants Fund, Scottish Refugee Council, 25 February

• Refugee Festival Scotland 2025 – Arts Open, Scottish Refugee Council, 25 February

• Protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity in relation to forced displacement, United Nations Human Rights Agency (OHCHR), 7 February

Calls for Papers

• One year on from the EU’s Asylum and Migration Pact: Critical Reflections, University of East London, 10 April
• Public Discourses about/by Women Migrants and Refugees from Central and Eastern Europe: (In)visibility and (Dis)empowerment, West University of Timișoara, 7 February
• Recognising Refugees: Refugee Admission, Relocation and Recognition Practices in Comparative and Transnational Social Sciences, 11 April 
• Work-In-Progress-Workshop: Migration Law in Times of Polarization, Vienna Centre for Migration and Law, 16 March

• Contribute to the Co-Lab Research Exchange, Migration Research to Policy

Back to top

Update subscription preferences ·  Unsubscribe from this list