Welcome to another issue of SEA STATE, where this week we are featuring our maritime counterparts on the civilian side!
Pandemic-driven supply chain issues, pictures of container build ups in the Port of Los Angeles and elsewhere, and rising concerns about the global economy have forced the commercial maritime sector into the American public consciousness. Often neglected in policy discussions, the international maritime industry moves the lion's share of raw materials, finished products, and storable energy. Most of the knowledge and capacity necessary for tasks such as laying telecommunications cable, responding to oil spills and shipwrecks, dredging harbors, and building port infrastructure is in commercial hands. What does this commercial control mean for military applications and questions of economic and diplomatic influence?
In the United States, both combat logistics and strategic sealift needs of the armed forces are provided by civilian operated and manned vessels via the Military Sealift Command. The remainder of government-owned strategic sealift ships is overseen by the Maritime Administration and operated by ship management companies staffed by civilian mariners. Recapitalization of the aging MSC and MARAD fleets is proceeding at a slow pace, with construction of the John Lewis-class oilers and Navajo-class towing, rescue, and salvage ships ongoing.
According to the last set of data released by the Maritime Administration, there are only 180 US registered commercial vessels of greater than 1,000 gross tons that carry cargo between ports. Of these, only 96 are Jones Act eligible. The Jones Act is a 1920 cabotage law that restricts the use of vessels carrying cargo between U.S. ports to those built, owned, and crewed by Americans. It can create trade distortions because of the high cost or lack of availability of American shipping. The number of ships in the U.S. registry has declined significantly since the end of WWII, owing to these high shipbuilding and labor costs, as well as the rise of flags of convenience. These factors created a deficit in the ability of American shipping to support military objectives, if called upon.
Complex commercial relationships underlie international shipping. It is not unusual for the shipowner, ship management company, charterer, ship’s officers, and ship’s crew to all be from different countries. Still, shipping remains an enormously powerful economic and diplomatic force that Americans have neglected over the last 50 years. Shipping creates networks in foreign states and contributes to indirect influence over trade policy. By allowing the size of the commercial merchant marine to decline, we have lost significant economic influence and military capacity while our competitors move forward relentlessly in this space. By comparison, the China-flagged Chinese merchant fleet numbered nearly 4,000 vessels in 2019.
Enormous military-relevant capacity exists in the commercial sector. To leverage this potential, commercial and military parts of the maritime world need to start a dialogue about their roles and responsibilities in wartime. American mariners already serve a vital role in peacetime military logistics, and will crew strategic sealift vessels held in reserve if they are activated in wartime. Shipping, logistics and stevedoring, marine construction, bulk fuel transport and storage, salvage, heavy lift, and emergency response, diving, shipbuilding and repair are all areas in which industry can both provide capability and improve understanding by stakeholders that may need these services in peace and war.
Sincerely,
Maxwell Anderson
Naval Architect, T&T Salvage, LLC
NEWS THIS WEEK:
“2021 China Military Power Report Released” (Department of Defense): The latest version of the DOD’s annual report to Congress on China Military Power was released last week. China military experts such as Andrew Erickson, Zack Cooper, Emily Carr Young, and Thomas Shugart have produced excellent summaries of this report while lauding it as the most substantial report to date. They have identified the following as key developments:
Nuclear Triad: Defense experts expressed concern about advancements in China’s nuclear capabilities. The report revised its previous estimates of Chinese nuclear stockpiles, predicting that China will have 700 nuclear warheads by 2027 and over 1,000 by 2030. The report also increased its projections for China’s supply of inter-continental and intermediate range missiles (For a comparison of this years’ and previous years’ projections, click here) and concluded that China’s Jin-class Type 094 SSBN and the H-6N nuclear-capable bomber are viable undersea-based and air-based nuclear deterrents. Understanding these rapidly-evolving nuclear capabilities and working to advance our own nuclear programs in response will be a key mission in coming years.
Amphibious and Expeditionary Capability: China’s advantage in shipbuilding and fleet size has been reported and commented on widely, and this report echoes past revelations that Chinese shipbuilding is greatly outpacing American shipbuilding. However, one key area of interest that experts focused on in the report is expeditionary and amphibious ships. China appears focused on increasing its expeditionary capabilities through the procurement of landing platform docks and landing helicopter assault ships. While China lacks the quantity of vessels needed to support a direct beach assault, the report observes that China could quickly build the ship-to-shore connectors or even utilize civilian ferries to support such operations. China’s demonstrated interest in amphibious and expeditionary operations is mirrored in the Marine Corps’ orientation towards amphibious and expeditionary warfare in the Pacific.
Global Presence: The report unveils surprising information about the quick expansion of the PLA’s global reach. The report details that a PLAN naval task group conducted training exercises near Hawaii in early 2020, while in Djibouti, the PLA has “interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones.” The report lists over a dozen countries the PLA may be considering for additional bases or logistics facilities. It also lists Argentina, Namibia, and Pakistan as sites of tracking, telemetry, and command stations to support the PLA Strategic Support Forces’ satellite operations. These trends will have the largest impact on officers, as 7th Fleet will no longer be the only area of operations in which there are routine encounters with Chinese military vessels.